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IS RES IPSA FOR THE DOGS?
H. W. HANNAH*
The expressions "for the dogs" and "going to the dogs" must have
originated in Asia-and most likely in a Muslim country where that
faithful animal has historically been held in rather low repute.1 Hence,
being consigned to the dogs was bad; it meant that you had not done
your "thing" well at all.
The burden of this article is not to maintain that res ipsa loquitur
should be so relegated, but rather to see if it might favor the dogs or
cats or cows or horses or pigs or laboratory animals in a controversey
between a nasty veterinarian and a fine, upright animal'-represented
in court these past few centuries by the owner, since animals have not
been considered proper parties to a lawsuit since some time in the Middle
Ages.8
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Res ipsa loquitur is the darling of plaintiffs' attorneys in medical
malpractice cases. It is one answer to the "conspiracy of silence," since
it speaks for itself.
Credit for initiating the res ipsa doctrine goes to Pollock, C. B. who
in the case of Byrne v. Boadle' said, "There are certain cases of which it
*Professor of Agricultural Law and Veterinary Medical Law, University of Illinois.
1. Mark Twain was sorely disappointed in the "Celebrated dogs of Constantinople."
Instead of fierce and ferocious packs he found "utterly wretched, starving, sad-visaged,
brokenhearted looking curs . . . mangy and bruised and mutilated . . . the sorriest
beasts that breathe ...in their faces a settled expression of melancholy. MARK
TWAIN, INNONCENTs ABROAD 257 (1869).
2. Animal has been defined in different ways: "Any member of the group of living
beings typically capable of spontaneous movement and rapid motor response to
stimulation." WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY; ". . . all living creatures not
human." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. "Man" is not classed as an animal in veterinary
practice acts, cruelty to animals laws and other laws obviously not designed to include
man, although biologically he is an animal. The Massachusetts law on the use of
animals for experimental purposes states that "Animal (includes) the dog and the cat
specifically and all other sentient creatures other than man." MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 49A, § 1(1966).
3. For a time during the Middle Ages, particularly in France and Germany, trials
in which animals were defendants were quite common. Capital punishment was
decreed for pigs, cows, horses or other domestic animals found guilty of killing or
injuring human beings; and in the ecclesiastical courts, actions to excommunicate or
excoriate were brought against pests of various kinds-mice, rats, locusts and roaches.
These were bona fide trials with counsel appointed to defend the animals. Apparently
a few lawyers gained some notoriety as successful defense attorneys in these trials.
E. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (1906).
4. 2 H & C 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863).
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may be said 'res ipsa loquitur' and this seems to be one of them. In some
cases the courts have held that the mere fact of the accident having
occurred is evidence of negligence. . . ."' In Byrne v. Boadle a barrel of
flour rolled out a warehouse window and struck the plaintiff. Judge Pol-
lock opined that a barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some
negligence. Why, he said, should the plaintiff have to call witnesses to
prove such negligence? In this case he referred to the theory of presump-
tive negligence-which might very well have become the name for the
res ipsa loquitur theory had the judge not chosen to use Latin terminology
in his decision. Judge Pollock also made other pronouncements in the
Byrne case which a hundred years later are still being discussed by legal
writers as facets of the res ipsa theory. Among them are the following:
A judge is not justified in leaving the case to the jury where the
plaintiff's evidence is equally consistent with the absence as with
the existence of negligence in the defendant.6
All accidents do not raise a presumption of negligence.7
The presumption of negligence calls upon the defendant to ex-
plain. If he can explain, then the case proceeds normally-that
is, the plaintiff must establish negligence by evidence.'
A definition of res ipsa loquitur which will satisfy both plaintiff's
and defendant's attorneys is difficult to formulate. In Johnson v. Mar-
shall9 the court stated:
[Res ipsa loquitur] asserts that whenever a thing which pro-
duced injury is shown to have been under control and manage-
ment of the defendant and the occurrence is such as in the
ordinary course of events does not happen if due care had been
exercised, the fact of injury itself will be deemed to afford suf-
ficient evidence to support recovery in the absence of any ex-
planation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was
not due to his want of care."0
Perhaps a better approach to an understanding of res ipsa loquitur
would be to analyze the circumstances under which it arises and the
purpose of the rule. Prosser" indicates that three conditions must exist




9. 241 Ill. App. 80 (1926).
10. Id. at 89.
11. PROssER, ToRTs 295 (3d ed. 1964).
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before res ipsa loquitur will arise: 1) The accident must have been one
which does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. 2) The agency
or instrumentality causing the injury complained of must have been
within the control of the defendant. 3) The injury must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.1"
Wigmore 3 warns against relegating res ipsa loquitur to the status
of a stereotyped rule to be arbitrarily applied in all circumstances. It
must be remembered that the basic reason for application of the theory
is that, innocent or not, the chief evidence of the cause of the injury is,
as a practical matter, accessible to the defendant but is inaccessible to the
plaintiff. Some current writers would take issue with Wigmore saying
than in view of modem discovery methods and more liberal rules of court,
evidence in many cases will be as accessible to the plaintiff as to the de-
fendant. 4 However, it is not the burden of this article to discuss dis-
covery techniques but rather to determine if res ipsa loquitur can come
to the aid of dogs, cats and other animals--excluding man.
The doctrine has been held applicable when facts and circumstances
permit an inference of negligence, growing out of superior knowledge,
control and management by the defendant and when the event as a matter
of common knowledge and experience would not have occurred unless
there were negligence.' 5 The doctrine is not based on established facts1"
but on inferred facts and hence is not the same as circumstantial evidence,
though some writers describe it as a species of circumstantial evidence.
Nor is res ipsa loquitur a rule of law or pleading. Its rejection does not
mean that negligence may not be established by circumstantial or by
direct evidence. Conversely, acceptance by the court does not preclude
the defendant from explaining the circumstances and, on trial, success-
fully rebutting the plaintiff's evidence. Once the defendant has explained
the presumption of fault, the plaintiff must then go forward with his
proof and establish negligence by a preponderance of the evidence.
In some jurisdictions the res ipsa loquitur theory shifts the burden
of going forward with the evidence to the defendant; and in a few juris-
dictions the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant.' Though in a
majority of jurisdictions the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff,
use of the res ipsa loquitur theory does create a prima facie case. If the
12. Id.
13. 9 WImOR, EVIDENCE, § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
14. See Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 852, 867 n.70 (1966).
15. Tayer v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 342 Mo. 912, 119 S.W.2d 240 (1937).
16. O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co., 307 Ill. 197, 138 N.E. 625 (1923).
17. The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases, supra
note 14 at 854-56.
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defendant offers no explanation, he cannot be awarded a directed verdict
and the case goes to the jury. On the other hand, failure of the defendant
to present any evidence does not permit a directed verdict for the plaintiff
-unless there is no question of fact and the negligence of the defendant is
clear. However, in nearly all cases where the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
is used, there will be a question of fact. Though the jury is not bound to
give any particular weight to the inference of negligence created by the
theory, such an inference may nevertheless make the defendant's case
more difficult since, in the opinion of many, juries in medical malpractice
cases are plaintiff-oriented; and the jury, not the court, draws the in-
ference.'"
VETERINARIANS AND THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR THEORY
General Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Veterinary Medicine
In medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs are ordinarily confronted
with the difficulty of obtaining expert medical testimony. Also, in many
instances they are either unconscious at the time of injury or not cogni-
zant of the circumstances or procedures which gave rise to their injury.
When applicable, the theory of res ipsa loquitur helps the plaintiff clear
both these hurdles by dispensing with the necessity for expert testimony
and by inferring from facts and circumstances that there must have been
negligence, for the injury would not otherwise have occurred. Since
plaintiffs in veterinary medical malpractice cases are confronted with
similar problems, it would appear that the res ipsa loquitur theory is just
as applicable to veterinary medicine as it is to human medicine.
The so-called "conspiracy of silence" is not confined to the medical
profession. With good reason, any professional man, be he doctor, lawyer,
veterinarian or engineer, is hesitant to testify against a fellow professional.
When one considers the important consequences to the professional man
of absence from his work and of uncertainty regarding the time or times
he will be needed, and the feeling of being something of a "dirty dog" for
testifying against a fellow professional and the further feeling that some-
how it is not good for the profession, the "conspiracy of silence" becomes
quite understandable. If difficulty in procuring expert testimony is not
as great in the veterinary profession as it is in the medical profession, it
is simply because there is so much less litigation. Reported medical mal-
practice cases throughout the country now number in the thousands
whereas reported veterinary malpractice cases probably do not exceed a
few hundred. In the writer's state of Illinois there are several hundred
18. See Carr, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Ohio-Does Any "Thing" or "Control"
Speak for Itself, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1968).
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appellate and supreme court cases involving medical malpractice and not
.a single one involving veterinary malpractice. It is likely that
throughout the country the ratio of appellate court cases to trial court
cases involving veterinary malpractice is lower than for medical
malpractice since claims would ordinarily be much smaller and an appeal
by either party less likely. There may, therefore, be more trial court ac-
tivity than reported appellate court cases indicate.
Application of the Knowledge Requirement to Veterinary Medicine
That facet of the res ipsa loquitur theory concerning the plaintiff's
lack of knowledge of the circumstances of his injury, it is submitted,
applies even more strongly in the field of veterinary medicine than in the
field of human medicine. First, animals cannot talk (this is the current
assumption'"), and hence could not relate any of the veterinarian's wrong-
doing even if they were conscious. Secondly, there is less likelihood of
nurses, anesthetists and other ancillary personnel being present during
surgery or postoperative care; hence, the res ipsa loquitur theory has
clearer sailing since the veterinarian is likely to be the only one who can
explain what happened. While it is true that in a large animal practice
the owner or members of his family may be present while a veterinarian
is treating an animal, an increasing percentage of today's veterinary
practice is concerned with small animals and is conducted in a veterinary
hospital where the owner is not so likely to be present when an animal is
treated or surgery is performed. Also, contract practice under which a
veterinarian undertakes to make periodic visits to large herds or flocks
is growing. Since such visits are regarded as routine, the owner or his
agent would usually not feel he need accompany the veterinarian unless
asked or unless some special situation had arisen requiring his presence.
The presence of the owner during treatment of his animal does not neces-
sarily preclude the use of the res ipsa loquitur theory. It simply makes
it less likely that the theory will apply, since the owner might then be
able to supply by direct evidence the "common knowledge" which under-
girds the theory.
In medical malpractice cases involving res ipsa loquitur several
19. There is evidence that this assumption is not wholly correct. Not only do
studies show that animals communicate with each other but that some, to a limited
extent, can communicate with man using man's language. R. SMYTHE, How ANIMALS
TALK (1961); Conly, Porpoises: Our Friends in the Sea, NATIONAL GEOCRAPHIC
MAGAZINE, Sept 1966, Vol. 130, No. 3. Animal psychology has become an important
subject in veterinary curricula, and veterinary practice acts are being revised to
include treatment of animals for a mental condition in the definition of "practice of
veterinary medicine." See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 124.3(1) (1967). Certainly
a veterinarian should "understand" animals better than most laymen understand them.
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rules and exceptions to rules have evolved. In the section which follows
we shall examine some of these rules as they appear to apply in the field
of veterinary medicine.
THE RULES OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND THE VETERINARIAN
The Veterinarian's Control and Custody
Most medical malpractice cases involving the res ipsa loquitur theory
have grown out of hospital situations. Injury by X-ray, burns from hot
water bottles, foreign objects left in an incision, improper administration
of anesthesia, physical injury resulting from restraint or movement of the
patient, removal of the wrong bodily organ and injury to a remote part of
the body while performing surgery in a specific area are some of the situa-
tions which have given rise to the application of the doctrine in human
medicine. Even a stronger argument can be made for the application of
the doctrine in animal hospital situations because, coupled with the con-
trol essential to application of the doctrine is physical custody of the pa-
tient amounting to a bailment. However, one should not too extensively
generalize because the degree of control by the defendant is itself a ques-
tion of fact. The large animal practioner, for example, may be aided
by the owner in treating an animal or in performing surgery, in which
case the owner himself would not only have some knowledge of the pro-
cedures used but might himself be guilty of contributory negligence. An
added factor in veterinary stiuations is the temperament of an
animal. A wild and unruly dog or cat, for example, might prevent opera-
tion of the doctrine when it might otherwise be applicable.
The Client's Contributory Negligence
Prosser indicates that absence of contributory negligence is essential
if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to apply."0 Though contributory
negligence may constitute either a complete or partial bar to recovery by
the plaintiff, depending on the jurisdiction in which suit is brought, it
would, according to Prosser, constitute a complete bar to the use of res
ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff as well as the defendant would be called upon
to explain circumstances surrounding the injury. However, as with other
cases in which contributory negligence is alleged, such negligence must
be a direct causal factor. Thus in Breece v. Ragan21 a veterinarian was
held liable for the loss of plaintiff's cattle which were trampled and killed
when they became frightened while he was vaccinating them. The plain-
tiff's father and a hired man had helped drive the cattle into a barn prior
20. PRossm, TORTS 295 (3d ed. 1964).
21. 234 Mo. App. 1093, 138 S.W.2d 758 (1940).
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to vaccination but did not enter the pen where the cattle were being vacci-
nated or help the veterinarian in any way. The court held that there was
no contributory negligence. In view of the current trend in res ipsa
loquitur decisions, contributory negligence could very well have been
applicable in Breece v. Ragan. If the theory had been urged, then the
precise conduct of the plaintiff's father and the hired man would have be-
come important. Were they actually present? Did they observe what the
veterinarian was doing? Did they realize what was happening? Did
they say anything to him? Since post-treatment care, and in many cases
even postoperative care, ordinarily rests with the owner of an animal,
contributory negligence should suggest itself to the veterinarian's attorney
as a likely defense.
The Common Knowledge Concept
The veterinary profession is much younger than the medical pro-
fession. Until fairly recent times, a court of law was likely to assume
that a farrier, horseshoer, stablekeeper, groom or almost anyone who
had daily contact with animals knew as much about them as the "horse
doctors" and the veterinarians of the day. Needless to say, this situation
is changing. The profession of veterinary medicine is recognized as call-
ing for the same high degree of skill and scientific endeavor as human
medicine. Indeed, in many areas the two professions are linked in their
endeavor to investigate some of the major diseases of men and animals.
Regardless of the present stature of veterinary medicine as a pro-
fession and a science, courts are still likely to assume that there is more
common knowledge about the treatment of animals than there is about
the treatment of man. It is well established that res ipsa loquitur will
not apply unless a layman can infer as a matter of common knowledge
that the injury would not have occurred except for the defendant's negli-
gence. It would seem, therefore, that the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
would be more extensive in veterinary malpractice cases than in
medical malpractice cases. This accords with the theory that the doctrine
is applicable only if a jury does not need the aid of an expert to find
negligence. In other words, as previously indicated, the injury must be
one which a layman knows would not ordinarily occur unless there is
negligence.
Reliance on the common knowledge doctrine will most likely in-
crease rather than diminish. Some of the factors responsible for such an
increase include the reluctance of professionals to testify against one
another, increased difficulty of the plaintiff in obtaining adequate proof
and recognition by the courts that the average juror's common knowledge
has increased. In more recent medical malpractice cases the doctrine has
Hannah: Is Res Ipsa For the Dogs?
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been extended to the faulty administration of anesthesia 2 and even to
cases of erroneous diagnosis where a certain diagnostic procedure is
common knowledge but was not used by the physician.2"
There is no reason to believe that circumstances in the field of medical
practice permitting application of the common knowledge concept to
support the res ipsa theory do not apply in the field of veterinary medicine,
though there seem to be no cases in the latter field directly in point.
Care and Skill of the Veterinarian
The care and skill required of a veterinarian corresponds to that
which the courts have established for members of the medical profession.
In Kerbow v. Bell,2 a veterinarian caused the death of four hound dogs
by dipping them in a mange solution which was too strong. The court
said:
A person professing and undertaking to treat animals is bound
to use in performing the duties of his employment such reason-
able skill, diligence, and attention as may ordinarily be expected
of careful, skillful and trustworthy persons in his profession.
And if he does not possess and exercise these qualities, he is
answerable for the result of his want of skill or care.28
In many cases the skill owed by a veterinarian has been measured against
that of other veterinarians in his locality. It is submitted, however, that
in view of the great increase in scientific medical knowledge and in the
ability to communicate such, the "locality" rule is either outdated or the
locality should be constituted of a much larger geographical area than
originally conceived. Though a veterinarian and a medical doctor were
called as witnesses in the Kerbow case, their testimony was conflicting
and it is a fair assumption that the defendant veterinarian could have
been found liable without their testimony. In refusing to accept the
defendant's contention that there was insufficient professional or expert
testimony to sustain the verdict, the court said that the defendant's own
testimony plus the direct evidence of several witnesses who ran the
hounds two days prior to their immersion in the defendant's dip and who
testified that they were then in good condition was sufficient.
Another case which illustrates how res ipsa loquitur might apply in
22. Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961).
23. Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1958). In this case the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was held applicable when a dentist failed to X-ray a tooth and hence did
not discover that part of it had not been removed.
24. 259 P.2d 317 (Okla. 1953).
25. Id. at 319.
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the field of veterinary medicine is Erickson v. Weber."0 The defendant
veterinarian was called to administer a worm remedy to the plaintiff's
sheep. Following his administration of the remedy, sixty-one sheep died.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, through his lack of knowledge or
skill, permitted the medicine to enter the sheep's lungs. A judgment for
the plaintiff was sustained. Though there was expert testimony in the
case, the court stated:
This testimony was substantiated by a reference to a treatise on
diseases of sheep by a recognized authority and bulletins of the
United States Department of Agriculture on the same subject.
There was ample evidence to sustain the contention of plain-
tiff's that the medicine was administered in a manner which,
according to the opinion of experts, is usually fatal."
The court might have added that livestock men generally know how to
administer a liquid to an animal without getting it in the lungs. This
was a case which could very well have been decided without the use of
expert testimony. The same type of reasoning supports the decision in
Voss v. Bridwell,2" a 1961 Kansas medical malpractice case in which the
res ipsa loquitur theory was held to apply when oxygen for an anesthetized
patient was channeled into the esophagus rather than the larynx.
In Staples v. Steed,2 the court held that throwing and hobbling a
horse was part of a veterinarian's treatment and that throwing the horse
on the side of a hill with unusual and unnecessary violence resulting in
its death from a ruptured diaphragm was negligence on the part of the
veterinarian. This case suggests that while some methods of restraining
animals or positioning them for surgery may involve knowledge solely
within the province of the professional, there are some methods which
fall in the area of common knowledge. Throwing a hog, for example, or
using a squeeze gate on a cow would seem to fit in this latter category.
Calculated Risk and Bad Result Concepts
An important limitation on the application of res ipsa loquitur is
the principle that the doctrine will not apply when the injury complained
of may occur even though reasonable care has been exercised. This
limitation has been further refined through the development of the "cal-
culated risk" and "bad result" concepts. The former applies where an
accepted method of medical treatment is known to involve a risk which
26. 58 S.D. 446, 237 N.W. 558 (1931).
27. 237 N.W. at 560.
28. 188 KarL 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961).
29. 167 Ala. 241, 52 So. 646 (1910).
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may produce damaging results regardless of care. If the defendant can
show that an accepted method of treatment involves a calculated or
even an unexpected risk, expert testimony must then be used to determine
if the damage was unavoidable or if it in fact resulted from the defendant's
negligence. In this connection, medical statistics and the history of a
significant number of cases involving the particular kind of treatment can
be introduced as evidence.
The so-called "bad result" rule is probably not so much a theory as
it is another way of saying that unless the jury can find as a matter of
common knowledge that the harm was probably caused by negligence, the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not applicable. As with medical practitioners,
veterinarians do not guarantee a cure and in rendering their service are
held accountable only for performing according to the standards of the
profession."0 Evidence of an unsuccessful treatment is not alone sufficient
to raise an inference of negligence. If a veterinarian treats an animal and
it either dies or fails to improve, there would be no cause of action against
the veterinarian arising from these facts alone. But in medical practice
there has been some inroad on the "bad results" exception. In Daiker v.
Martin,"' the physician set a cast overly tight, resulting in impaired cir-
culation and an infection in the plaintiff's leg. The leg had to be amputated.
The court sustained the plaintiff's contention that, as a matter of common
knowledge, such things do not ordinarily occur if the physician uses
ordinary skill. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine was held to apply. A
similar result was reached in Olson v. Weitz32 when after a cast placed on
plaintiff's arm by the defendant was removed, the bone showed a marked
displacement and a bone graft was necessary to correct the condition.
The above cases suggest that the doctrine could apply in similar situations
involving a veterinarian's treatment of an animal. These cases also
suggest that there might be such a thing as a circumstance being "within
the common knowledge of experts." In other words, if an expert can say
that as a matter of accepted expert opinion certain events do not occur
unless there is negligence, the jury could then infer negligence from the
happening of the event, thus establishing something which might be
called "common expert knowledge" or "expert common knowledge."
Although we have seen that res ipsa loquitur may be applied in med-
ical malpractice cases when the complaint involves a faulty diagnosis, an
improper innoculation or failure to give proper aftercare following
surgery, cases of this nature involving res ipsa loquitur seem not to have
30. Barney v. Pinkham, 29 Neb. 350, 45 N.W. 694 (1890).
31. 250 Iowa 75, 91 N.W.2d 747 (1958).
32. 37 Wash. 2d 70, 221 P.2d 537 (1950).
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arisen in the veterinary field. In the few reported cases involving a claim
of improper diagnosis by a veterinarian, expert testimony has been used. 8
Defects in equipment used by a veterinarian resulting in injury to an
animal may permit use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. If the defect is
latent and could not have been discovered by the veterinarian, certainly
the theory would not apply. On the other hand, if it is something about
which the veterinarian has knowledge-insecure fastening of X-ray
equipment, permitting it to fall on the patient-the theory would apply.
Obviously the defect must be of such a nature as to indicate that harm will
result to a patient. If it is the kind of defect which does not make injury
resulting from its use foreseeable, the res ipsa loquitur theory would not,
of course, apply.
Advances in scientific knowledge, development of new products and
equipment and acceptance today of that which was rare yesterday, all
expand the area in which the res ipsa loquitur doctrine can apply. For
example, testing the patient for drug reaction and allergy has now be-
come accepted. In the years ahead, practices unknown today will come
to be generally accepted and enter the domain of "common knowledge."
Either by common law or Good Samaritan statutes, veterinarians
may be excused from ordinary negligence in the treatment of human
patients at the scene of an accident. 4 Civil Defense laws provide similar
relief. Yet there may still be a place for res ipsa loquitur under these
circumstances. If "gross negligence" becomes the standard it might be
said to be even more evident to the average man that a doctor or a veter-
inarian has acted "grossly" than that he is guilty of only ordinary negli-
gence. Furthermore, control by the veterinarian in such situations is
likely to be much more complete-hence, fulfilling to an even greater
degree one of the requirements for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
Multiple Defendants-Respondeat Superior
With the growth of specialization in medical practice and in hospital
procedures, several persons may be involved when a patient is treated.
This is particularly true when there is surgery. If there is fault and the
33. Bekkemo v. Erickson, 186 Minn. 108, 242 N.W. 617 (1932) (failure to diagnose
hog cholera); Hohenstein v. Dodds, 215 Minn. 348, 10 N.W.2d 236 (1943) (mistakenly
diagnosing and vaccinating for hog cholera) ; Phillips v. Leuth, 200 Iowa 272, 204 N.W.
301 (1925) (alleged negligent diagnosis and improper method of vaccinating hogs-
held for the defendant); Boom v. Reed, 69 Hun 426, 23 N.Y.S. 421 (Sup. Ct. 1893)
(failure to return and check on horse under treatment by the defendant).
34. "May be excused" is used advisedly since many Good Samaritan statutes do
not include veterinarians, and the conunon law theory about the liability of one who
renders aid in an emergency is by no means uniform from state to state. In some it
provides as much protection as a Good Samaritan statute; in others, it does not.
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evidence does not clearly point to a particular person, how does the plain-
tiff proceed ? Is res ipsa loquitur ever applicable in these situations?
If all of the persons involved are employees or agents of the practi-
tioner, the problem is simplified. It does not matter then which person
caused the injury; the plaintiff need sue only the principal, and under the
theory of respondeat superior, the principal can be held liable regardless
of where the fault actually rests. This would probably be an answer in
most veterinary malpractice cases, though in the large cities and in some
animal hospitals, more than one independent party may be involved.
There is authority for the application of res ipsa loquitur even if, for
example, the anesthetist or X-ray technician is not an employee or agent
of the veterinarian. In Ybarra v. Spangard,"5 a landmark decision in
which the plaintiff awoke from an appendectomy to find that his right
shoulder had been injured, the diagnosing practitioner, the surgeon, the
physician-owner of the hospital, an anesthetist, a nurse on duty during
surgery and a special nurse assigned to his room after the operation were
all joined as defendants. The trial court granted the defendant a non-suit
from which the plaintiff appealed claiming that the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine applied. The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
held for the plaintiff saying that it was sufficient for him to show that he
awakened with an injury not connected with surgery and that this may
constitute "as clear a case of identification of the instrumentality as the
plaintiff may ever be able to make." 6 This seems consistent with other
decisions in which a plaintiff is not put to the risk of determining, among
several persons actually participating in an event, who actually caused
the injury or damage complained of.37 As a matter of fact, an even
stronger case might be made for the application of res ipsa loquitur under
the circumstances in Ybarra. If the purpose of the doctrine is to permit
the plaintiff to make a case when it is clear that there has been negligence
but the plaintiff is unable to state how it happened, then by the same
token he should be able to use the theory when he is unable to say who is
responsible, but knows that it must be one of a determinable group of
persons. Such a situation might create some pressure on the person ac-
tually responsible to speak up, for if he does not, the innocent members of
the group who have to compensate the plaintiff may seek retribution.
In veterinary malpractice cases involving an employee or agent of
35. 25 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
36. 154 P.2d at 690-91.
37. In Fowler v. Cade, 214 Ill. App. 153 (1918) the court held the defendant liable
for all the damage done to the plaintiff's sheep where evidence showed the defendant's
dog to have been one of a pack of dogs attacking the sheep; other dog owners were not
known and the exact damage caused by the defendant's dog could not be ascertained.
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the veterinarian, the courts have had no difficulty in applying the respon-
deat superior theory and finding the veterinarian liable. 8 Also, in medical
malpractice cases, though nurses or other hospital personnel are not em-
ployees of a surgeon, they may be regarded as his agents if they were
under his direction and control at the time the injury complained of oc-
curred. This is sometimes referred to as the "concert of action" or
"captain of the ship" doctrine. It is just as applicable in veterinary medi-
cine as in human medicine.
CONCLUSION
Acceptance of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases has in-
creased markedly-so much so in the opinion of some writers and legal
scholars that defendants are often times held liable without a clear case
having been made against them. This is said to stem, in part at least,
from the philosophy that an injured patient should not go uncompensated.
The impact of this philosophy will likely be felt in veterinary mal-
practice cases, though to a lesser degree.
In considering the application of the res ipsa loquitur theory to
veterinary malpractice cases, the following observations are re-
levant: 1) The mere fact that an animal was injured by a veterinarian
or by his employees or agents does not support application of the doctrine.
2) A presumption created by application of res ipsa loquitur yields to
any contrary proof and is thus destroyed. 3) There may be an inference
of negligence on the part of the veterinarian without the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine applying. 4) An admission by the veterinarian that his act
caused the injury complained of may create a presumption in favor of the
plaintiff but does not justify application of the res ipsa loquitur theory if
the defendant disclaims fault (unless, of course, it would otherwise apply).
5) Application of res ipsa loquitur does not depend on a contractual re-
lation. It could be applied to a veterinarian rendering gratuitous service,
to Civil Defense and emergency cases and to other situations in which
there is no privity of contract.
With advances in science and standards of the veterinary profession,
the practitioner's vulnerability to malpractice actions, whether or not res
ipsa loquitur applies, is likely to increase. As more sophisticated equip-
ment is introduced into the practice of veterinary medicine, more selec-
tive drugs and medicines made available and more persons brought under
38. In Acherman v. Robertson, 240 Wis. 421, 3 N.W.2d 723 (1942), the defendant
veterinarian's son who was helping him sold a client Lysol, mistaing it for mange
oil; and in Beck v. Henkle-Craig Live-Stock Co., 171 N.C. 698, 88 S.E. 865 (1916),
an assistant of the veterinarian failed to adequately restrain a mule. In both cases the
veterinarian was held liable for the damage which resulted.
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the control of the veterinarian in his practice, a plaintiff will have a greater
number of opportunities to seek compensation for an alleged negligent
injury to his animals.
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